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A B S T R A C T
How do governments in China and Western democracies differ in their technological response to control the
transmission of the pandemic? Based on an analysis of academic papers, World Health Organization reports and
newspapers, this research compares two opposing approaches, whereas the Chinese cities and government have
adopted a techno-driven approach, Western governments have adopted a human-driven approach to control the
transmission of Covid-19. The findings highlight that although the techno driven approach may be more pro-
ductive to identify, isolate and quarantine infected individuals, it also results in the suppression and censoring
the citizen views. It is further emphasized that human interaction with the technology is mediated by the po-
litical and institutional context in which the technologies are implemented. This paper contributes to literature
by understanding the human-technology relationship, and offers five practical observations for controlling virus
transmissions during pandemics.
1. Introduction
Pandemics leave enormous burdens on our lives, economies, and
societies at large. A pandemic is generally defined as a new disease that
rapidly spreads in a number of countries and continents. Even a mild
pandemic can kill several millions of people (Osterholm, 2005). Over
the past hundred years or so, we have seen three deadly pandemics,
namely, in 1918, 1957 and 1968 (Mills, Robins, & Lipsitch, 2004).
Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) is the most recent pandemic that has
resulted in unprecedented social and economic impact on society.
Covid-19 is one of a large group of viruses that was transmitted to
humans from bats in a local live animal market in Wuhan in late 2019
(Ji, Wang, Zhao, Zai, & Li, 2020). It infects the upper respiratory tract
and can result in pneumonia and other associated illnesses, which can
eventually affect the central nervous system, ultimately leading to
death for those with underlying health conditions. Given the potential
for human-to-human transmission and that inventing a vaccine would
ideally take about one or two years, the World Health Organization
(WHO) recommended that governments worldwide should quickly in-
tensify active surveillance to identify infected individuals to allow rapid
isolation and quarantine (Heymann & Shindo, 2020).
Geographically, Covid-19 has had a significant impact on cities.
Cities contribute a whopping 80% of the total global GDP and host
about half of the global population (The World Bank, 2019). As a result,
cities became hubs for the quick transmission of the pandemic. Rapid
urbanization, population growth, and increased global travel attribu-
table to globalization have all contributed to this transmission. How-
ever, we are fortunate that our current cities are more resilient than
ever before. This is due to the increased adoption of smart technologies
such as the Internet of things (IoT), big data, and artificial intelligence
(AI). Especially cities in China and Western democracies are known for
adopting smart city based technologies. For the purpose of this paper,
Western democracies include the United States of America (USA), the
United Kingdom (UK), Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
France and Spain. These countries were highly affected by Covid-19 in
the initial three months after its first transmission.
These cities either adopt a techno- or human-driven approach under
the smart city framing (Kummitha & Crutzen, 2017). While the techno-
driven approach seeks ubiquitous adoption of smart technologies, lar-
gely pushed into cities by using the top-down approach, the human-
driven approach encourages cities to educate their citizens and enhance
their social and human capital that would help develop and adopt smart
technologies necessary in cities (Mora, Bolici, & Deakin, 2017). These
new-age technologies have been employed by city governments as part
of their initial response strategies.
By the end of the first three months since the virus was identified,
while China is able to control its initial outbreak and is up and running
again, Western democracies continue to struggle in controlling the virus
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transmission. For instance, China's response has been described by the
WHO-China Joint Mission report as “the most ambitious, agile and
aggressive disease containment effort in history” (WHO, 2020a, p. 16).
Whereas the response from Western democracies was considered in-
adequate. With this background, the current article reviews academic
papers, WHO reports and newspaper articles published in the first three
months following the Covid-19 outbreak in China to answer the fol-
lowing research question: How do governments in China and Western
democracies differ in their technological response to control the
transmission of the pandemic?
This research finds that with the use of the most sophisticated
technologies and stringent surveillance imposed across the cities in the
first three months following the outbreak of the virus, the Chinese
government adopted the techno-driven approach and was able to keep
the transmission relatively under control. However, the Western
democracies, have chosen to adopt the human-driven approach to
tackle the pandemic. This research argues that the impact of the
human-driven approach is slower than the techno-driven approach in
controlling the transmission of the virus. It is further argued that while
technology can contribute to enhancing resilience and controlling
transmission, censorship and human involvement with technology limit
its potential. As a result, the impact of smart technologies is potentially
moderated by the social and political contexts in which they are im-
plemented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second
section below reviews the literature on smart technologies in China and
Western democracies, while the third section describes the research
approach adopted. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the smart
technologies used by China and Western democracies, respectively. In
the sixth section, it is emphasized how human interventions mediate
the potential of technologies. The seventh section provides an overall
discussion, considering both the theoretical and practical implications
of this work. The last section concludes the paper, highlights the lim-
itations of this research and proposes avenues for future research.
2. Review of the literature
The growing urban population and the need to enhance the po-
tential of city-level governance systems have given birth to the smart
city concept (Kummitha & Crutzen, 2017; Lee & Lee, 2014). From a
technological point of view, smart cities are equipped with some sort of
IoT to collect and analyze data. IoT devices include sensors, processors,
wearables, electronics, software, actuators, vehicles, cell phones and
computers (Kankahalli, Charalabidis, & Mellouli, 2019; Mora, Deakin,
Reid, & Angelidou, 2019). These devices collect data from different
locations in the city (Kummitha, 2018), and analyze it using AI for the
betterment of city-level planning. AI refers to intelligent machines that
think autonomously without significant interference from their human
counterparts. Conventionally, significant amounts of time are required
to collect, understand and derive trends from such data, whereas AI
helps draw imperatives within seconds (Davenport & Ronanki, 2018).
The analysis by AI improves with the addition of new information,
which makes it more intelligent (Kumar, Ramachandran, & Kumar,
2020). These intelligent machines self-learn and improve their perfor-
mance based on the big data being gathered by the IoTs installed across
the cities. Big data refers to the large amount of data generated from
IoTs. One of the prominent uses of big data generated from the IoT
helps draw cognitive insights, which allows the detection of patterns
using dedicated algorithms (Davenport & Ronanki, 2018). The IoT de-
vices integrate different government departments and establish a plat-
form that hosts data and allows to offer urban services to citizens
(Zhang, Zhao, & He, 2019). For example, data from vehicles, mobile
phones, and cameras along the roads are used to inform about traffic
conditions and provide traffic solutions. Similarly, health care records
are analyzed to understand patients' backgrounds and underlying
health conditions to offer better treatment. Although cities have been
using big data for the past decade to identify weather changes, (Kitchin,
2014), and other urban problems including transportation and public
safety (Diaz-Diaz, Munoz, & Perez-Gonzalez, 2017), the use of big data
has proven to be extremely valuable in the health sector and during the
current outbreak of Covid-19.
When it comes to the governance of smart cities, the level of tech-
nology adoption is determined by either the techno- or human-driven
approach they adopt (Kummitha, 2018). While the former refers to the
enhanced use of technologies, largely using a top-down method in
which governments enforce technologies on cities and citizens, the
latter refers to educating and enhancing the potential of communities
that help create and promote their own technologies based on the local
needs. For the last decade, Europe, north America and China have en-
gaged in transforming their cities into smart cities.
2.1. Smart technologies in Chinese cities
China's interest in using smart technologies for governance dates
back to the overall shift in its innovation policy that began in the early
2000s (Ling & Naughton, 2016; Liu, Simon, Sun, & Cao, 2011). Ac-
cording to the 2015 statistics, the urban population in China accounts
for 56% of the total population, and given the improved living stan-
dards and new employment opportunities in cities, it is expected to
increase exponentially in the next two decades to 76% (Wu, Zhang,
Shen, Mo, & Peng, 2018). In response to the growing population, China
has taken an active role in building smart cities where technologies
have been used significantly to aid urban governance. One estimate
indicates that there are about 500 world-class smart cities present in
China (Mak, 2020). Wuhan, the most affected city during the current
COVID-19 outbreak itself is a smart city. China stated its commitment
to building smart cities in the 12th Five-Year Plan published in 2010
that set a blueprint for the socio, economic and political goals for the
next five years. The National New Urbanization Plan which came into
effect in 2014 and lasts until 2020 has largely taken charge of con-
structing new smart cities and remodeling existing cities into smart
cities (Zhu, Li, & Feng, 2019). Furthermore, the former Premier of
China, Li Keqiang, emphasized in 2015 that smart cities and smart
technologies are the two major priorities in the development of the
country. The 13th Five-Year Plan, the first under President Xi Jinping's
leadership, takes the smart cities vision even more seriously with the
aim of not only promoting them but also creating inter-city infra-
structures and partnership building among them, which would further
aid the national government in its governance (Dameri, Benevolo,
Veglianti, & Li, 2019). The concentration of political power in the
central government and its control over the provinces and cities allows
it to quickly make arrangements for coordination.
At the micro level, the IoT is so far penetrated into Chinese daily life
that passenger bus rides are often charged based on facial recognition
technology. Furthermore, smart devices are connected to utilities such
as rubbish bins, which are electronically connected to a system that
alerts authorities when they are full (Andrelini, 2019). Thus, both the
built environment and citizens in the major cities have been oriented
towards the adoption of the enhanced use of the IoT for the past
10 years. As a result, China has the most sophisticated IoT industry,
thanks to its aspirations for building smart cities (Kshetri, 2017). In
addition, it has the best technological manufacturing industry in the
world (Li, 2018). With the help of the IoT, big data, and AI, cities can
perform continuous monitoring, offer catastrophe warnings, and make
quick decisions (Zhu et al., 2019). Among the other sectors, health care
has benefited significantly due to the heightened adoption of new-age
technologies (Sun & Medaglia, 2019). As a result, China has one of the
strongest technological potentials for handling pandemics compared to
other countries.
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2.2. Smart technologies in western democracies
Unlike in China, the regional and city governments in Western
democracies enjoy balanced power-sharing with the central govern-
ments. Similar to the Chinese context, population growth in urban areas
has resulted in cities, especially in North America and Europe, adopting
smart city technologies (Albino, Berardi, & Dangelico, 2015). The
European Union, for example, initiated several strategies including the
European Smart Cities & Communities initiative (Kylili & Fokides,
2015), and the European Innovation Partnership for Smart Cities and
Communities (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019). These programs allow Eur-
opean cities access resources from the European Commission to trans-
form their cities into smart cities. Most Covid-19 affected countries in
the Western context are known for their advanced smart cities. These
countries are highly interconnected with each other largely due to their
geographical proximity and the trading partnerships they have with
China. This is the reason the Covid-19 pandemic was able to easily
transfer to the major cities in these countries from China (Cohen &
Kupfesrchmidt, 2020).
The IoT is interconnected into the physical and human world to
offer smart solutions for city-wide problems. Angelidou (2014) shows
how New York, for instance, one of the cities highly affected by Covid-
19, adopted the IoT for gathering insights from the communities. Other
smart cities in the USA include, Washington DC, Boston, Denver,
Seattle, Los Angeles, Chicago and Philadelphia (Pyzyk, 2019). When it
comes to Europe, Barcelona, a highly affected city in Spain, also built its
smart city technological ecosystem to enhance its usage of smart
technologies. Especially, IoT driven services in Barcelona smart city
have claimed to improve quality of life for its citizens (Kamel Boulos &
Al-Shorbaji, 2014). Care, Trotta, Care, and Rizzello (2018) argue that
Milan, a smart city in Italy, was built around several innovative me-
chanisms to adopt smart technologies. Further research emphasizes
other smart cities including Berlin and London (Zvolska, Lehner,
Palgan, Mont, & Pleplys, 2019), Paris (Martinez-Balleste, Perez-Matinz,
& Solanas, 2013), and Amsterdam (Mora, Deakin, & Reid, 2019b).
Given the level of smart technologies adopted, smart cities are claimed
to offer best living conditions and are equated with healthy cities
(Kamel Boulos, Resch, Crowley, et al., 2011).
2.3. Techno- or human-driven approach
Despite the growth of smart cities in China and Western democ-
racies, the techno- or human-driven approach that generally cities
adopt in their smart city governance determines their level of techno-
logical usage to interact with citizens. The techno-driven approach
largely places heightened importance on technologies and makes citi-
zens subordinate to the technologies adopted in the cities. Techno-
driven approach does not take ‘context’ into consideration, rather ex-
pects technologies to fix all the glitches in cities (Janssen & Kuk, 2016).
This approach resonates with the ‘hard technological determinism’ that
considers new technologies as basis of society where they play a pivotal
role in structuring the social systems (Bannister & Connolly, 2020;
Nograsek & Vintar, 2014). The inherent capabilities of smart technol-
ogies are expected to solve problems experienced by the governments
(Helbig, Gil-Garcia, & Ferro, 2009). While Techno-driven approach may
be more effective in imposing law and order and offer techno-driven
objective governance, it may also curtail human freedom, enhance
censorship and raise ethical questions (Bimber, 1994).
In contrast, the human-driven approach is oriented towards citizens,
where technologies are selectively used, allowing citizens enjoy their
freedoms. This approach resonates with ‘soft technological de-
terminism’ where individuals retain agency in determining technolo-
gical use (Nograsek & Vintar, 2014; Pool, 1983). Under this approach,
governments also enhance social and human capital among their citi-
zens which allow developing technologies based on the local need.
There is an overall understanding that human-driven approach allows
governments adopt smart technologies to ensure better citizen en-
gagement, to offer accountability (Gil-Garcia, Zhang, & Puron-Cid,
2016; Mora, Deakin, Reid, & Angelidou, 2019), and streamline inter-
actions between communities and government (Androutsopoulou,
Karacapilidis, Loukis, & Charalabidis, 2019). Additionally, citizens seek
greater participation in the planning of urban development strategies,
often initiating local enterprises (Kummitha, 2019). The variance in the
techno- and human-driven approaches potentially holds a key to de-
termining the level of smart technologies used in the context of both
Chinese and Western democracies to control the Covid-19 transmission.
3. Research approach
This section highlights the data selected for conducting the study,
the methods, and the analytical approach adopted.
3.1. Data selection
Given the active role China plays in the global markets and the
networks it forges across the globe, there has been a heightened interest
among the governments, businesses, healthcare providers, and in-
dividuals to seek further information about COIVD-19 and the me-
chanisms that help China fight in controlling the transmission of the
pandemic. WHO has urged the Chinese government, medical commu-
nity and scientists to publish information actively about the emergent
trends. As the virus transmitted to other parts of the globe towards the
end of January 2020, Western media have made a significant effort to
show how technology has been used by Western democracies in con-
trolling the transmission. Further, the scientific publishing houses have
fast tracked publishing on Covid-19 and made all the published re-
search openly available for anyone to use. In addition, media outlets
have shown keen interest in not only publishing current trends but also
various interventions being initiated to control the outbreak. Given the
availability of the information from both scientific and media pub-
lishing houses for the Covid-19 related literature, I have chosen to re-
view the scholarly articles, WHO reports, and newspaper articles to
address my research question.
3.2. Methods
For academic articles, I ran through a search in Scopus on 31st
March 2020 with search phases such as Coronavirus OR COVID-19 AND
tech* and limited the search to identify those articles which were
published in the year 2020. This search resulted in a total of 52 pub-
lications. I have chosen only those which were published in 2020 be-
cause Covid-19 was first identified on 31 December 2019. In addition, I
have also refereed through 137 news items that covered the first three
months of the pandemic and focused on technologies. The search was
conducted in google news and limited to the popular media outlets
including BBC news, CNN, The Guardian, The New York Times,
Business Insider, The Telegraph, The Economist, Reuters, Financial
Times, ABC News, GlobalTimes China, and China File. The use of media
outlets to identify the novel mechanisms has been useful to understand
the trends and the approaches adopted by various governments (Zhang,
2016). In line with the research question, I have largely focused on
technological responses adopted by China and other Western countries.
Further, I have read 71 situation reports released by the WHO. These
reports have been released on a daily basis from 21 January 2020. The
use of research articles, WHO situation reports and news from media
outlets form a basis to triangulate the data (Kennedy, 2008).
3.3. Analysis
I have read through all the articles, WHO situation repots, and
newspaper items manually and identified clusters of information that
could feed into this article. I have carried out a co-occurrence analysis
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for analyzing relationships among the major constructs (Kim, Lee, Kim,
Lee, & Suh, 2015). As part of the co-occurrence, two constructs need to
appear together in a large part of the data being analyzed (Boschma,
Heimeriks, & Balland, 2014). As part of the analysis, I used the WHOs
recommendation and adopted three constructs– identify, isolate and
quarantine for reducing the virus transmission, and seven additional
constructs from the adoption and use of technologies to probe techno-
or human-driven approaches. Those constructs include governance,
smart technology usage, privacy concerns, lockdown, activism, in-
formation sharing, and infodemic. These constructs are drawn from the
data, allowing to understand whether governments adopt techno- or
human-driven approaches and associated benefits and concerns. The
findings are discussed in the sections four and five below. While section
four discusses the Chinese response, the section five articulates the re-
sponse from Western democracies.
4. Smart technologies and Covid-19: A Chinese perspective
Given the centralized power structure, the virus outbreak in Wuhan
smart city and its quick spread to other cities forced the central gov-
ernment to step up. The central government actively set the IoT eco-
systems into motion by bringing together different key stakeholders and
devices to trace and track the individuals who were infected. In line
with the WHO's (2020b) recommendation to identify, isolate and
quarantine those who are infected, China made use of its well-estab-
lished surveillance system and placed cities under complete quarantine
using a draconian approach. This has been enforced across the country
under the premise of feichang shiqi (which means extraordinary times).
It is shown below how China has used its technology to control the
spread of the virus. These findings indicate that most of the Chinese
efforts were invested in identifying infected patients.
4.1. Active surveillance and identifying the infected
One specific advantage China has is its surveillance system. A recent
report highlights that most of the Chinese investment in smart cities is
built around improving surveillance on their citizens in addition to
focusing on the built environment (Andrelini, 2019). For instance, the
smart city of Chongqing in China currently uses 2.6 million security
cameras to conduct surveillance of the city's 15.35 million people,
equating one camera for every six residents. It is followed by the
Shenzhen smart city which has 159 cameras per every 1000 residents,
then the Shanghai smart city with 113 cameras, the Tianjin smart city
with 93, and the Jinan smart city with 73 cameras, all per every 1000
people. These are the five most surveilled cities in the world. Kharpal
(2020) emphasizes that during the quarantine, the government even
installed CCTV cameras on apartment doors to ensure that residents
would not leave their quarantined houses. Some of these cameras in-
clude AI technology and facial recognition to identify people (Keegan,
2019).
Chinese cities were coordinated under the central leadership to
make use of the sensors for data collection throughout the cities, con-
duct decentralized testing, and flag those who were infected by Covid-
19. The AI technology developed for identifying individuals is so robust
that while CT scan results can take up to 15 min to diagnose, AI can
complete the task in 10 seconds (McCall, 2020). Drones equipped with
cameras and controlled by operators were further deployed for con-
ducting surveillance and issuing instructions and warnings to those
failing to wear masks or failing to follow the emergency protocols. In
cases where citizens failed to report their travel history in the affected
areas, IoT devices were used to ascertain their travel history and flag
those cases (Liu & Li, 2020). For instance, the travel of individuals to
the affected areas was monitored and reported to the concerned au-
thorities by AI applications (Jie, 2020). In addition, corporate firms
allowed the government to access their systems hosting the mobile
applications (apps) that citizens routinely use to track down their travel
history. For instance, apps such as Alipay and WeChat which are po-
pularly used across China, helped the government to track down those
who were infected (Kupfesrchmidt & Cohen, 2020).
Public transportation has also adopted specific technologies to
identify those likely to be infected. Megvii Technology Limited, for
instance, has developed an AI body temperature screening system (as
having a high or very low temperature is one of the basic symptoms
used to identify those infected with Covid-19) which was deployed in
most of the metro stations in China. This AI-based system screens up to
15 patients every second from a maximum distance of 3 m based on
non-contact remote temperature screening. Baidu, another AI firm,
joined the efforts in developing another body temperature scanner,
which can scan about 200 people per minute. Other AI firms, such as
SenseTime, have also joined in the efforts in developing contactless
temperature detection software that has been installed in public places
(Jakhar, 2020).
Further, infrared systems with display screens have been installed in
popular areas. As people pass through the system, their body tem-
perature is displayed on the screens. Officials monitor the screens to
identify those who were infected. Furthermore, police officers in the
Chengdu smart city wear smart helmets that detect people with high
temperature within a 5-m radius. Thermal scanners were installed in all
major Chinese train stations, and once infected persons were identified,
they were transferred to a local isolation room from where their travel
history was collected to understand where they had travelled and thus
identify other potentially infected persons. AI has been used to integrate
body and face identification with the help of dual sensing by visible
light and infrared cameras to help authorities quickly identify patients.
Overall, the AI systems are highly efficient and a source of relief for the
overstressed health system in China.
The data collected from different IoT devices are shared with the
central server and analyzed using AI to supply the necessary medical
resources. In the virus epicenter, Wuhan smart city, administrators
coordinated with a consortium comprising five well-known laboratories
and set up an emergency response center in Wuhan to enhance the city's
virus testing potential. The consortium developed testing kits through
war footing that could detect the virus more quickly and comprehen-
sively. One of the well-known firms, BGI, initiated an anti-epidemic1
initiative which quickly led to 22 cities covering 100 s of companies
joining the initiative to develop test kits (GEN, 2020).
4.2. Isolate the infected from others
AI has been useful in assisting the understaffed medical professions
to navigate through the available data and understand the emerging
trends. At the Zhongshan hospital in Wuhan, a doctor's team used
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)-accelerated AI to identify the visual
signs of the virus from those who were likely to be infected. Infervision,
a Beijing based start-up, developed a GPU-accelerated AI which was
initially intended to detect cancer in the lungs. The system was re-
modeled for the purpose of detecting Covid-19. The app, Close Contact
Detector, was developed to help people find out whether they had been
in close contact with someone who was potentially infected.
The travel history of patients who were tested positive for the virus
was posted online via social platforms and media outlets, allowing
other potential victims who had come close to the patient in the last few
days to self-isolate and report to the concerned authorities. The much-
matured smart city-based ecosystem which comprises the government,
private firms and start-ups, came together to release mobile apps to
help citizens check if they had been in contact with infected persons. In
Suizhou, which is 170 km from Wuhan, 2.2 million citizens were able to
register their health condition using mobile apps. Yang Fei, the vice
chief for Fuhe town in the Suizhou smart city, emphasized that “the
1 Until 11th March, WHO used epidemic to describe the virus outbreak.
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technology we use today in epidemic control was hard to imagine in the
past” (Jie & Quao, 2020, p. 1). A digital prevention system developed
by Alibaba in collaboration with Suizhou enabled DingTalk and Alipay
apps to allow citizens to register for health care systems. This tech-
nology enabled the self-registration of patients meaning there was a
reduced need for them to visit hospitals and spread the infection to
medical professionals (Jie & Qiao, 2020). In addition, two major hos-
pitals with a capacity for 1000 beds each were built in Wuhan on war
footing to accommodate infected patients.
4.3. Lockdown and quarantine
A new health code was implemented in over 100 cities via an online
prevention system allowing people to share their travel history and
health status. Every citizen is allocated with a QR (also known as Quick
Response) code, which allows to track his/her movements. When citi-
zens use public services such as public transportation or visit a super
market, they are expected to scan their QR code. When infectors are
detected, then those who could have been possibly infected, including
those who travelled on the same bus or those who visited a super
market at the same time, are informed and a quarantine procedure
followed thereafter. Based on the information shared, individuals were
allocated a particular color code. Those allocated a red color code were
either affected by the virus or those had travelled recently to Hubei
province. Those given a yellow code were required to self-isolate for
two weeks (the incubation period for detecting the virus; Lauer et al.,
2020), and those given a green code retained access to the city (Jie,
2020). AI determined the allocation of codes but very little information
is available about the procedure used for allocation (Krolik & Satariano,
2020).
In addition, China also chose to lockdown the highly affected re-
gions and cities. For instance, in Hubei, the lockdown was imposed
from 23rd January, where 15 cities including Wuhan were completely
locked down. Drones were employed to ensure that the lockdown was
strictly implemented. The entire public transport system was sus-
pended. Citizens were not allowed to leave their houses and neigh-
borhood community-based committees were empowered to take group
orders from residents.
While the entire world was closely observing China, its sophisti-
cated technology-based manufacturing industry and technology-based
ecosystems came to the rescue in assisting the authorities and imposing
discipline among the masses. WHO refers to this approach as “un-
precedented in public health history”. The infrastructure China had
built over the years to conduct surveillance on its citizens became a
source of advantage.
5. Smart technologies and Covid-19: A Western perspective
While China was able to “implement astounding, unprecedented
and medieval” policies in containing the virus transmission, such an
approach may be hard to impose anywhere outside China (Cohen &
Kupferschmidt, 2020, p. 963). Human rights experts, for instance, argue
that the extreme surveillance measures followed in China may not work
in other countries, as they impose severe restrictions on human rights of
the citizens (Kupfesrchmidt & Cohen, 2020). While China largely fo-
cused on identifying those who are infected, Western democracies have
focused on human-driven approach, comprises of collecting anonymous
data, ensuring lockdowns, and quarantine. How this strategy varies
from that adopted in China is now considered.
5.1. Active surveillance and identifying the infected
Unlike the surveillance system in Chinese smart cities, smart cities
in Western democracies have heavily invested in the human capital of
citizens. Western societies place significant importance on individual
privacy and freedom, which have conventionally resulted in stringent
privacy laws. For instance, several states in the United States have
banned facial recognition technologies (Pyzyk, 2020). In Europe, the
European Union General Data Protection Regulation which came into
effect in 2018 aims for greater transparency in collecting and preser-
ving data, thereby ensuring personal data protection. Although smart
cities have adopted the IoT to a different degree, data protection laws
ensure that the data is not used in such a way that individual freedom
and privacy are curtailed. Accordingly, these countries have largely
used means of consensus building and persuasion to control the virus
transmission.
As a result, instead of rapidly employing technologies to screen ci-
tizens or access their mobile phones, the Italian and German govern-
ments approached mobile operators to share anonymous and ag-
gregated data about the concentration and movements of the citizens in
areas where Covid-19 is prevalent. The USA has conducted talks with
Facebook and Google to access its anonymized data. A mismatch be-
tween regional and national policy regulations furthered the compli-
cations in sharing this anonymized data. Such data are useful to un-
derstand how many people are following the imposed strict lockdowns
(Polina & Busvine, 2020). This is quite in contrast to the Chinese ap-
proach which was more active in identifying infected individuals.
Governments often find it hard to navigate through data privacy laws
and not to breach the trust conferred by the public on the government
(Servick, 2020). In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) partnered
with Amazon, Microsoft and Hancock to analyze the data collected by
the NHS telephone service to move available resources to tackle the
pandemic. This partnership is expected to develop visual dashboards
that offer necessary information for policy makers to inform effective
policies (Kelion, 2020).
As existing technologies were not useful for collecting data from
citizens due to the privacy regulations in place, several countries in-
cluding the USA, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK have
adopted drive-through testing method to identify those who are in-
fected. Further, universities and start-ups developed new apps that
allow people to voluntarily share their data. The UK Covid symptom
tracker app, for example, tracks the symptoms of infected individuals
and determines the range of virus spreading in a particular area to help
understand why some people become critically unwell compared to
others (Wakefield, 2020). In order to collect more personalized data,
startups have come forward to create voluntary and privacy-conscious
tracking apps such as: Safe Paths in the USA, and GeoHealth in Ger-
many which aims to collect GPS location data and store it for 28 days.
These apps allows individuals to share their data with health officials,
should they be tested positive for the virus (Servick, 2020). Similarly,
Germany has developed Corona Data Donation smart watch App which
gathers anonymous data from volunteers to track down the infections.
However, pressure groups have immediately started to put pressure on
the government to respect the privacy of citizens (Kelion, 2020).
5.2. Isolate the infected from others
Although Western democracies have well equipped technological
potential and documented information about their citizens, the lack of
coordination between regional and national governments in Spain,
Italy, the USA, and the different health care departments in Italy, have
limited their potential in isolating patients from non-patients. For in-
stance, the Italian prime minister has emphasized that the regions
which have the autonomy to implement healthcare have failed to
manage the situation adequately. Different regions with different levels
of understanding and a lack of coordination have contributed to the
spread of the virus. For instance, in Spain, the regional government of
Madrid and the national government have failed to coordinate in a
timely way (Tremlett, 2020). The lack of coordination initially between
smart cities has also resulted in people travelling from one city to an-
other. Both in Italy (smart cities in the north to south), Spain (Madrid to
Barcelona) and the USA (New York to other cities), people have
R.K.R. Kummitha Government Information Quarterly 37 (2020) 101481
5
travelled from highly affected smart cities to other cities.
As citizens generally use their unique personal identification num-
bers for accessing healthcare facilities, government bodies in Italy have
the necessary equipment to track down patients and thus strengthen
their datasets. However, this information is typically handled by dif-
ferent uncoordinated regional and national healthcare institutions
(Carinci, 2020). Italy has faced a situation whereby the lack of co-
ordination between different healthcare departments has resulted in the
failure to use available big data effectively. Smart cities, in general,
require active coordination among different departments and levels of
administration (Angelidou, 2014). Similar situations may be found in
other decentralized administrative regimes, including in Germany and
the USA, where regions and cities have powers to draw their own
strategies, which sometimes would require special laws to impose one
specific approach.
The initial lack of coordination between various departments,
among different smart cities, and regional and national governments
have all contributed to the failure to create effective strategies to use
existing resources or to restrict the spread of the virus. Despite these
limitations, the technologies are used to different degrees by govern-
ments to isolate infected individuals. Table 1 below summarizes the
level of techno- and human-driven approaches adopted by China and
Western democracies.
5.3. Lockdown and quarantine
While Western countries have not adopted technological ap-
proaches for screening and isolating infected patients, they have
heavily focused on the lockdown of affected regions and/or entire
countries. For instance, the UK, France, Spain, and Germany, among
other countries, have followed the national lockdown approach.
Although Italy started with regional lockdown, it later imposed a na-
tion-wide lockdown. Overall, there is a general understanding that
imposing lockdowns is somewhat draconian in free societies. As the
Prime Minister of the UK claimed, “No prime minister wants to enact
measures like this”. The police and army have been called in to impose
lockdowns in these countries. Drones have been deployed in countries
such as Spain, Italy, the USA, Germany and France to strictly implement
lockdowns. By the time the lockdowns were imposed, the coordination
among the government departments and different cities with their na-
tional governments has been strengthened in most of the countries.
6. How human intervention mediates the potential of
technologies
The difference between the technological response from China and
the Western democracies shows how an authoritative regime can force
the use of smart technologies to address a pandemic. However, the very
same authoritative regime also forcefully censored the voices of its ci-
tizens and reduced the potential of technologies to prevent the wide-
spread infection of the virus. When Li Wenliang, the whistle-blower
doctor who first identified the infection trend while working in the
Wuhan Central Hospital sent a message in a chat forum to fellow doc-
tors about the potential of the virus outbreak, his views were censored.
Wuhan city authorities forced him to write an apology, and the gov-
ernment claimed that the doctor was disturbing the social order (Green,
2020). A total of eight individuals were investigated by the state in
connection with this development. Many activists who questioned the
government's initial response strategy were forced into quarantine de-
spite not showing any symptoms related to the virus (Xiong & Gan,
2020). China is notoriously known for employing smart technologies to
censor any content or data that citizens upload to social media websites
that the government does not feel comfortable with (Westcott, 2020).
United Nations Development Program (2015) for instance highlighted
that, Chinese smart cities are largely focused on the technology infra-
structure, known as hardware. Communities are seen as passive bene-
ficiaries of these technologies rather than playing an active role in the
society, which resonates with the hard technological determinism (Hu
& Zheng, 2020). Overall, the Chinese context illustrates how technol-
ogies can be largely used to communicate government planning and to
impose citizen compliance.
The Chinese crackdown on whistle-blowers has been a major con-
cern in an authoritarian regime where citizens have very little freedom
to express their opinions. Although the communication from Wenliang
had the potential to spread information using a digital chat forum and
quickly help people take precaution measures, the government none-
theless censored his views. This helped the government to ensure that
the only information available was that which it released (Woodward,
2020). The censorship has potentially hampered the ability of digital
technology – in this case, a chat forum – to control the spread of the
virus to other parts of China and the world. Those who questioned the
government's strategy have been put under house arrest. As Zhangrun
(2020) summarizes, government and bureaucrats “stood by blithely as
the crucial window of opportunity that was available to deal with the
outbreak snapped shut in their faces” (p. 2). This is the reason he argues
that this catastrophe has been turned into a manmade pandemic. In an
interview, Wenliang highlighted that “If the officials had disclosed in-
formation about the epidemic earlier I think it would have been a lot
better” (Green, 2020, p. 682).
Furthermore, scientists and activists have been silenced from
speaking out about China's lack of early response (Thorp, 2020). Al-
though cases in China started to appear from as early as 8th December
2019, the authorities did not make announcements about this until 7th
January 2020 (Editorial, 2020a). The Mayor of Wuhan admitted that
there had been a delay in announcing the information about the virus as
the national government had not given clearance in a timely manner
(Ayittey, Dzuvor, Ayittey, Chiwero, & Habib, 2020). In addition, it was
not until 20th of January that information about human-to-human
transmission was announced. However, Wenliang in his WeChat mes-
sage sent on 31st December had emphasized the human-to-human
transmission potential of the virus. Research has now confirmed that
human-to-human transmission took place starting from the middle of
December 2019 (Li et al, 2020). Although the Premier Jinping later
ordered the free flow of information in a timely fashion, an array of
information sources about Covid-19 were censored from the internet,
depriving people of the opportunity to know more about the virus. As
Kavanagh (2020) highlighted, openness, transference and quick re-
porting remain active response strategies during an outbreak, which
Table 1
China's Techno-driven approach versus human-driven approach adopted by western democracies.
China Western democracies
Identify Largely relied on technologies to identify individuals who have been most
likely infected.
Due to the rights conferred on the protection of individuals privacy, these countries
rely on consensus building to access anonymous and aggregated data or to collect
data from those who volunteer.
Isolate Created awareness using technologies to ensure everyone, both infected and
uninfected, could be traced with their mobile phones, in order to ensure
quick isolation.
Lack of coordination between different departments and regional and national
governments have constrained the potential to isolate quickly those who have been
infected.
Quarantine Heavily relied on technology imposed lockdowns Relied on both technology assisted and manual lockdowns
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had been altogether missed due to the authoritative nature of govern-
ment action. Overall, the acts of censorship and the concealment of
information resulted in reducing the potential of technologies to be
harnessed to effectively communicate about the virus.
Compared to the Chinese context, Western democracies had plenty
of time to plan their management of the crisis before potentially iden-
tifying transmitted cases in their regions. However, governments to
different extents downplayed the potential of transmission and the
damage it could cause. For instance, the president of the USA was vocal
until the second week of March that the damage would be minimal. A
similar strategy was visible in the case of the UK. Gaps in governance
resulting from the decentralized political system remain a constraint to
effectively implementing strategies. In addition, the individual freedom
and rights conferred to individuals, the privacy protection laws enacted
and the human-driven approaches adopted in smart cities, all limit the
potential to actively adopt technologies to constrain the transmission of
the virus compared to China.
7. Discussion
The findings indicate that while China has adopted a techno-driven
approach, Western democracies have relied on a human-driven ap-
proach. As summarized in the Table 2 below, both the Chinese and
Western governments have initially denied the potential risk from
Covid-19. However, while China has denied the impact of the virus by
adopting the means of suppression, the Western democracies have de-
nied by freely sharing the information with their citizens. When it
comes to the governance aspect, Chinese smart cities have actively
coordinated where the majority of interventions have been drawn from
the central government (Normile, 2020). In comparison, lack of co-
ordination in the Western context between the cities, regional govern-
ments and the national governments have contributed to the quick
transmission of the virus. When it comes to adopting ubiquitous tech-
nologies, China draws its strategies based on a techno-driven perspec-
tive, where its well established technological ecosystem has been mo-
bilized to impose technological solutions (Hu & Zheng, 2020). In
Western democracies, technologies are selectively used, partly due to
the human-driven approach adopted in promoting technological eco-
systems that allow limited use of technologies. For instance, Western
democracies continue to rely on anonymous data, which may not be as
effective as collecting data from individuals (Stamali, Papadopoulos, &
Anagnostopoluos, 2015). The data protection laws in the Western
democracies ensure personal data protection. Such a provision limits
the governments options to collect data from citizens directly. As
Caragliu et al. (2011) highlighted, these smart cities focus on social
inclusion, knowledge networks, voluntary organizations, and social and
relational capital, in addition to achieving social and environmental
sustainability. The overall intention is to empower communities as
smart communities which are able to develop their own smart tech-
nologies and use them for solving urban problems. In order to enhance
creativity among citizens, these smart cities have invested in building
city-level ecosystems that can bring government, communities, private
firms and universities together, so that cities act as clusters of
innovation to enable and facilitate the invention of technologies that
look after their needs and bring competitive advantages to the cities
(Kummitha & Crutzen, 2019).
Accordingly, the enhanced use of technologies and data collection
in the Chinese context raise privacy concerns which are not addressed
by the government authorities. The enormous investment in surveil-
lance has meant that Chinese smart cities have become surveillance
cities. Moreover, it has systems in place that ensure citizens follow rules
set forth without fail and demonstrate discipline towards the govern-
ment and state. For instance, the mobile phones of citizens are re-
portedly spied upon repeatedly using government-sponsored mobile
applications such as Great Nation, which is used by 100 million regis-
tered users including students, civil servants and workers that have
installed the app under pressure from the government. Scores are al-
located to those who spend time on the app, which is seen as a symbol
of patriotism as the app allows citizens to learn about the leader and the
history of the country. Those with low scores are often shamed and
penalized in schools and workplaces (Hernadez, 2019). As Braun, Fung,
Iqbal, and Shah (2018) highlighted, more data collection would create
further opportunities for privacy invasion, whereas Western democ-
racies are forced to work within strict data privacy laws that protect the
privacy of their citizens.
Most importantly, citizens are disciplined while using technologies
in China such that whistleblowers and other activists were silenced
from raising further concerns about the Chinese authority's regime.
Thus, controlling transmission and censoring the whistleblower about
transmissions reflect the use of technology for meeting contradictory
ends. Technologies are instead used by the government in the Western
democracies to inform decisions and to find ways in which problems
can be addressed (Hollands, 2008; Komninos, 2008). Further, activists
are freely allowed to write to the governments to speak up about the
rights of the citizens and to seek for transparency in the governments
approach. While these countries have freely shared the data about the
virus transmission and allowed everyone aware about the growing
trends, China has been accused of concealing information from public
and international community. However, due to the techno-driven ap-
proach, China has not reportedly witnessed infodemic. Infomedic refers
to the misinformation in circulation. Whereas the widespread avail-
ability of social media in Western democracies resulted in infodemic, as
the WHO director highlights “we're not just fighting an epidemic
(pandemic); we're fighting an infodemic” (The Lancet, 2020, p. 537).
These findings highlight that a techno-driven approach may be more
effective compared to human-driven approach in controlling the virus
transmission during pandemics. The political and social arrangements
in Western democracies most likely do not allow top-down technolo-
gical visioning, thereby reducing the potential impact that technologies
can have.
7.1. Theoretical implications
The case of Covid-19 highlights that the smart technological re-
sponse to controlling a pandemic may be more effective in authoritative
regimes, as we have witnessed in the Chinese context. Governments
Table 2
Summary of the different responses from China and Western democracies.
China Western democracies
Initial response Denial by suppression Denial by communication
Governance Coordination: Centrally controlled administrative regime was able to quickly
coordinate with the cities and impose rules and regulations
Lack of coordination: Decentralized power concentration between the city
and national governments resulted in lack of coordination
Smart technologies Smart technologies are deployed ubiquitously Technologies are selectively deployed
Privacy Government has unanswered privacy concerns Governments have clarified their protection of privacy
Activism Whistle-blowers are not allowed to speak up Activists can write to the governments and speak up about their rights
Information sharing Accused of hiding information Openly share information within and outside the country
Infodemic Very limited due to censorship Prevalent due to the mass usage of social media.
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may gain full control over the situation by adopting a techno-driven
approach and imposing technologies to tackle the pandemic. The en-
hanced use of technology allowed Chinese authorities to reach into the
private space of individuals and breach the privacy of its citizens. Such
a forceful approach helped the Chinese regime keep the virus trans-
mission under control in a relatively quick timeframe (Johnson,
Robinson, & Philpot, 2020). The level of technology deployed to impose
government regulations shows that technology is useful for taking
forward the stringent policies set forth. The well-established smart
technology ecosystem aids their cities and lets the national government
coordinate the strategy. While conventionally, societal needs and norms
determine individual behavior, modern days mark the enhanced use of
technologies to impose discipline and compliance. The Covid-19 re-
sponse from China provides direct answers for smart city researchers
who raised questions around the problem-solving potential of urban
technologies (Greenfield, 2013). The techno-driven approach proven
effective to control the virus transmission. However, Western democ-
racies may choose much more holistic approaches by the means of
consensus and persuasion, where technologies are used to educate ci-
tizens and ensure their compliance with the rules set forth. Under such
circumstances, controlling the transmission of the pandemic may be
slow and time-consuming. Although technological ecosystems are ac-
tive in Western democracies, they are mostly oriented towards adopting
human-driven approach.
Despite the positive effect in controlling the transmission in the
Chinese context, the authoritative nature of the political establishment
has, in fact, limited the potential of the technology itself through cen-
sorship. Concealing information about the virus for over a month al-
lowed it to transmit among the population and across regions. As a
result, the nature of the political and institutional context moderates
the level of surveillance and discipline imposed. The political and in-
stitutional context played a major role in limiting technological de-
terminism (Janssen & Kuk, 2016). In the Western context, the societal
and institutional set up does not allow the top-down approaches fol-
lowed in the Chinese context. Thus, it is safe to argue that, although
smart technologies are said to have transformative powers, their po-
tential is subject to the social, political and institutional context in
which they are deployed (Kuk & Janssen, 2013; Kummitha, 2020).
Earlier research has articulated that smart city initiatives often lack the
engagement of social and political conditions (Luque-Ayala & Marvin,
2015). However, the present work highlights that the political and in-
stitutional context has indeed played a key role in determining the
course of action for controlling the virus transmission.
Further, early research emphasized that smart technologies in-
stitutionalize and mechanize processes by collecting and analyzing data
and then solving problems without significant levels of human inter-
vention (Chatterjee, Kar, & Gupta, 2018) and that interaction between
humans and devices would result in ‘superior judgements’ (Sohoemaker
& Tetlock, 2017). The literature has also emphasized that smart city
spaces are governed by algorithmic administration and categorization
(Dalton, Wilmott, Fraser, & Thatcher, 2020), whereas this research
demonstrates that such an understanding is merely an imaginary. This
research also highlights that governments continue to retain their
agency and conceal information that they deem not to be shared, which
limits the influence of technologies. Although the smart city literature
emphasizes that technologies aid city authorities in addressing stubborn
social problems, the way that Covid-19 has been handled highlights
that the techno-driven approach do not directly result in technological
determinism, rather, it offers a vector of options for decision-makers to
choose, based on their own judgment. As a result, the impact of smart
technologies is less effective in smart cities than has been projected in
the literature (Hollands, 2008), because of the way humans use, in-
terpret, manipulate and communicate the trends picked by the IoT
based on political and institutional needs. In addition, the potential of
technologies is constrained by the social and institutional arrangements
prevalent in national contexts. Thus, those who govern may continue to
exploit new-age technologies for their own benefit.
7.2. How to control human-to-human transmission during a pandemic? Five
practical recommendations
First, we have learned that the Chinese techno-driven approach
appears to be more promising than the human-driven approach largely
adopted in Western democracies. However, one specific aspect gov-
ernments should address during health emergencies is ensuring that
their citizens are fully informed about their privacy rights and assured
that any data collected during the pandemic will be handled to benefit
the society at large. Governments also need to ensure that the enhanced
collection and use of data will be temporary and the activity will cease
once the situation comes under control. In this way, governments will
be able to assure their citizens about their rights and the governmental
responsibility to protect these rights. Such an approach allows citizens
to voluntarily come forward to communicate their health data and
download dedicated mobile apps to share their health updates and lo-
cation histories. In countries where the top-down adoption of technol-
ogies is impossible, this approach allows crowdsourcing the informa-
tion from citizens. A specific strength of technological advancement is
that communities even in the developing and least developed countries
have access to mobile technologies, and hence, data may still be
sourced (Klaus, 2020).
Second, governments need to actively share the information they
collected about infectious diseases with their citizens and global com-
munity. This allows global community to make necessary arrangements
to prevent the transmission. Governments may be able to roll out early
surveillance measures and organize the medical supply chains. As ad-
vised by WHO and learned from the Chinese context, early surveillance
is the most effective strategy available for the prevention of transmis-
sion. While conducting the surveillance that matches with the Chinese
approach may not be possible in most of the modern democracies, the
governments need to impose lockdowns as early as possible. The delay
in imposing lockdowns may result in excessive transmission as hap-
pened in several Western countries in the case of Covid-19.
Third, cities need to partner with each other in addition to actively
coordinating with the national governments. Authoritative regimes
may need to empower their regional governments to share health re-
lated information quickly, whereas in the Western context, the co-
ordination between regional and national governments needs to engage
in a sustained effort to minimize the impact.
Fourth, in order to control the impact of infodemic, there is a need
that the authorities keep vigilant and ensure passing the information to
the public quickly. Governments may need to partner with the tech-
nology based firms that own the social media platforms to control in-
fodemic. Fifth, there is a need for sharing best practices among the
countries such as encouraging different key stakeholders in their tech-
nological ecosystems to come together to invent and implement ne-
cessary technologies which may help detect and isolate the infected
patients, and build community-level resilience in order to cope with the
crisis. I believe that this is the right time to promote the smart com-
munity concept where communities build resilient and address their
own social problems (Gil-Garcia, Helbig, & Ojo, 2014).
8. Conclusions
This paper discussed how China and Western democracies differ in
their approaches to adopting smart technologies to control the trans-
mission of the Covid-19 pandemic. While Chinese smart cities have
actively coordinated and let the national government take control over
the regions in a techno-driven approach, the smart cities in the Western
democracies have initially lacked in their coordination efforts with the
national governments and adopted a human-driven approach to control
the transmission. Although both China and Western democracies have
well-established technological regimes, technological usage differed
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significantly in both contexts, largely as a result of constraints imposed
by the political and institutional environments. While in the Chinese
context, governments adopted top-down technologies to discipline and
censor their citizens, in the Western context, technologies were used to
inform, persuade and attain consensus among citizens to help limit
virus transmission. In both contexts, findings highlight that humans
mediate with the technologies and limit their impacts. However, there
is an overall concern that governments may take advantage of the
Covid-19 to reinforce technological visioning on citizens beyond con-
trolling the pandemic.
8.1. Limitations and future research
The issues discussed in this paper need to be generalized with
caution. First, given the ongoing nature of Covid-19, many aspects
highlighted in this article may continue to evolve. Second, the news-
paper-based analysis used in this article was unstructured. For instance,
experts have specifically raised their concerns about China's capabilities
regarding censorship. They argue that the WHO and the Western media
have largely relied on the information censored by the Chinse govern-
ment to make their arrangements (Jong, 2020). Hence, these findings
need to be generalized with caution.
The Covid-19 outbreak is not only about health care, but also
businesses, livelihoods, wellbeing, innovation and resilience. While
medical researchers and scientists are active in bringing out new find-
ings and data about the pandemic, scholars from other disciplines
should come forward and contribute to advancing our combined po-
tential to face this pandemic. In particular, it would be interesting to
understand how cities and governments in other countries are handling
the pandemic. Further research may focus on rural areas as well to
understand the strategies rural communities and governments adopt to
limit the transmission.
It may also be useful to understand how technologies are used to
enhance the potential of the health care systems in different countries.
It will also be interesting to study how service firms, including essential
delivery services, have used technology to aid delivery. For instance,
Lin (2020) shows that during the lockdowns grocery orders were de-
livered in 20 min in major cities in China. However, we need more
evidence from different parts of the globe. There is also evidence that
community-based initiatives, both technological and non-technological
in nature, are in effect to serve the most needy and vulnerable. For
instance, community-based apps, such as the Nextdoor app, offer ne-
cessary support for those in need in the community. Thus, it is worth-
while to study community-level resilience and how it supplements or
even replaces technological responses to handling the pandemic. The
other research avenue is to study how governments, technology firms
and international agencies address the infodemic to control fake news.
Overall, research on the technological innovations, local community
active participation to build resilience, partnerships being built to
contain the outbreak, and process innovations could build the resilience
of cities and help address the current and future outbreaks.
In addition, lockdowns have resulted in the world's largest work
from home experiment. It will be worthwhile to study how various
technologies have been useful for workers, universities and businesses.
For social scientists, it is an opportunity to study several rarely ex-
perienced occurrences. What happens when everyone works from
home, universities go online, communities follow social distancing, and
governments are free to collect whatever information they wish to
collect or make new provisions and laws to enhance their own powers,
thus curtailing human rights and citizen privacy (Harari, 2020). While
the majority of these changes will return to previous normality in due
course, governments may continue to employ some measures that re-
strict the freedom and powers of individuals. For example, the National
Assembly of Hungary voted to confer sweeping powers to the govern-
ment to rule by decree during the Covid-19 emergency. Thus, it would
be interesting to understand what kind of impact such developments
leave on the society. Further, it is also worthwhile to study how the
technologies and innovations employed by the governments to control
the Covid-19 transmission are used beyond the pandemic control and
how citizens react to them.
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